Bouciquaut and the Wheel of Fortune

by David S. Hoornstra

In the English-speaking world, one of the most popular historical clichés is the vainglorious French knight with more pride than brains charging into a hail of deadly English arrows wearing armor more costly than effective against them.

As known to most of us, the story of Bouciquaut would seem to support that cliché. Our hero was the younger of two famous soldiers, father and son, both named Jehan le Maingre, both of whom became Marshal of France, both known primarily by the nickname “Bouciquaut.” Their lives only overlapped by four years. The Boucicaut name in history is further confused by our hero's brother Geoffroy who signed himself in one charter "Boucicaut son frere" and Froissart calls “Boucicaut the Younger” in a Tunisian context.

Barbara Tuchman called our Boucicaut “the epitome of knighthood,” in terms that suggest more pride than sense. Froissart wrote him large as a young tournament hero. A page on campaign at 12, knighted at 16, a “crusader” at 18, a Holy Land pilgrim at 22, Marshal of France at 26. He married well above his station and was not only embraced by kings, emperors and popes, but praised by Christine de Pizan. He founded a votive order of chivalry, organized and fought in the most famous jousts of the fourteenth century and lost the most famous battle of the next. On the French knightly hero’s checklist, he fell short only by not having a heroic death like that of de Charney.

But there is far more to Bouciquaut than glory and cliché. His rapid rise to wealth raises questions about our hero’s character. He embraced his inherited nickname in spite of its “moneybags” or “loot-baskets” connotation. Was Bouciquaut a knightly idealist, or was he, as his nom-de-guerre suggests, just a clever, calculating soldier with his eye on the main chance, a mercenary at heart who worked the social systems of his time to win wealth and a hero’s renown?

At Nicopolis in 1396, the wheel of fortune turned under our hero with a pronounced downward jerk. Blaming French chivalric culture for the disaster, Tuchman singled out Bouciquaut’s aggressive bravado for extra credit. What he learned from Nicopolis is an open question. As Governor of Genoa from 1401, he was far from cautious, using the Genoese fleet to attack the Turks wherever he could, and almost starting a war with Venice in the process. He became politically entangled with the Florentines over Pisa, putting him at odds with his old ducal supporter. In 1409, while he was serving French interests in Milan, the Ghibelline faction of the Genoese citizenry teamed up with brigands to lock him and his French garrison out, never to return. Finally, he was one of the losing generals captured at Azincourt.

Tuchman calls Bouciquaut “chivalry’s hero,” but defines chivalry of the times in negative terms, seeing a self-aggrandizing quest for glory in every knightly tradition, privilege and action. In particular, her criticism of nobles taking front-row seats in battle carries less weight when you consider that, in Bouciquaut’s time, the front-line position rarely meant the glorious cavalry charge. Over thirty years of battles large and small, you can count his mounted charges on the fingers of one hand. For him, the front-line privilege was enjoyed *on foot*, whether assaulting a strong place, boarding an enemy ship, or, finally, slogging through the mud at Azincourt. It meant more time under fresher fire than anyone else, with less protection of bodies or distance. It meant you got the most pressure in a crush of bodies, and if wounded you were buried deeper in the pile. For a leader, it meant being the

first to take the consequences of one's tactical errors. Such was the privilege Bouciquaut's flesh was heir to.

There are many ways to define heroism. 30 years before our hero's birth, Geoffroy de Charney's recently-Englished book *Chivalry* demanded mesure and restraint of the knight, good sense, defining knightly success not in terms of tournament victory but in terms of service to one's lord and Christianity, especially, but not exclusively, in battle. De Charney emphasized the knight's role as leader and judge, expecting him to fulfill political roles with knowledge and address when military events thrust him into administrative situations – a circumstance Bouciquaut experienced many times.

If de Charney's book expressed the curriculum for French knights, their *agenda* was set by the times, and it would be easy to assert that the times in which Bouciquaut lived were suited better to the ruthless than the selfless. Born in 1366, he grew up with the Great Schism, caused by Charles V's big mistake …supporting the Avignon popes, whose existence would sink every approach to Anglo-French peace for the next forty years. Bouciquaut was 14 in 1380 when Charles died and left the kingdom to a young son who grew up to be Mad King Charles VI. His reign, progressing from a minority dominated by four uncles to an adult life of frequent insanity with only four good years in between, truly earned the term "calamitous." R.C. Famiglietti's book *Royal Intrigue* gives a vivid account of what can happen when four French dukes and a Bavarian queen fight for control of a government whose king is clearly insane a little less than half the time and a conscientious but behind-the-times administrator-king the rest.

The king's madness came on dramatically in 1392. He would recover for weeks or months, then relapse. For the rest of his life, he would retake direction of the government when lucid – a government which steadily lost power as he got older. For the first few years, France enjoyed relative calm, but in 1396 French fortunes entered a steep decline. An "all-star" Franco/Burgundian army marched to the aid of Hungary's King Sigismund took over the mission, invaded the Ottoman Empire and was so thoroughly destroyed at Nicopolis that it took three months for the news to be believed in Paris. The 1407 assassination of the Duke of Orleans by the Duke of Burgundy's men created a feud that eventually became a civil war with Paris and the royal family alternately players and pawns.

Throughout Bouciquaut's life, in spite of long periods of truce with England, many sections of France were still being fought over by both cat's-paws and independent companies. The threat from England, in sporadic alliance with Burgundy, placed constant stress on the French leadership, undermining what little solidarity it had and culminating in defeat at Azincourt, the Treaty of Troyes with Henry V of England, the revenge axe-murder of Duke John the Fearless in 1419, and the disinheritance of the Dauphin in 1420.

The anonymous biography, *Livre des faites de bon messire Jehan II le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, Governeur de Jennes*, was written between 1404 and April 1409, and has appeared since in several editions of widely-varying quality and completeness. As a result, it has enjoyed varying degrees of respect as an historical source. In his essay on translations in *Teaching Chivalry*, Joseph T. Cotton categorized it in the genre of "chivalric biography,"[5] which for him means of suspect value, being likely to be fanciful, romanticised or even fictional. When you survey the feats and accomplishments decribed in *Bouciquaut*, reminiscent of the fictional Tirant lo Blanc, it is hard to blame Cotton, who was writing without the benefit of Lalande's monumental work.

French scholar Denis Lalande compares the biography's writing quality with that of Froissart, and makes it clear that this is no "Guy of Warwick" yarn. After publishing linguistic studies on what he declares to be the original manuscript in previous years, Lalande produced a carefully-researched French edition in 1985. In the preface, he traces all previous editions, including that cited by Joseph Cotton, to manuscript Bibliotheque National MS ff 11432, noting that each has errors or serious lacunae. Going much further, his 226-page 1988 study compares the narrative with every possible historical source including Italian and Islamic. He was not the first to study Bouciquaut. He lists 7 French works on the biography itself, and 21 historical studies, of which 8 are Italian, 1 German, and 12 French, mostly written in the twentieth century.

In her 1995 essay on the authorship of the "Livre des faites," Helène Millet carries Lalande's work further. She agrees with him that the BN manuscript is the original source of all other reported versions of the biography, extant or not, and surmises the book was started in 1404 but brought to a hasty finish during the Genoa crisis of 1409, and perhaps circulated in its present state among the French court to remind them of Bouciquaut's long and faithful service.

Its present state is a narrative up to the year 1409 penned into a parchment book with the rubrics painted in but with empty space for four miniatures. Appendix A is a chronology of Bouciquaut's life and times.



The 1409 manuscript. BN MS ff 11432, p. 1r
Bibliothéque Nationale, Paris

Bouciquaut, from *Heures de Mareschal Boucicault*
Musée de Jacquemart-André, Paris

Bouciquaut commissioned a Book of Hours c. 1405 from a painter who for a century would be known only as The Boucicaut Master, but whose high reputation would rest on work done for Peter Salmon and the French dukes.

Bouciquaut got off to an early start and lived 56 very full years. His father was a career soldier from Touraine who became a Marshal of France under kings Jean II and Charles V, for whom Lalande calls him “a wise councillor and able diplomat.” In a colorfully-rendered account of an encounter with Sir John Chandos, Froissart depicts him as courageous but too practical to die over stones, mortar, or high-sounding phrases. His first wife died childless, but late in life he married into a noble family, With his second wife, Fleurette de Linières, he begat two sons, Jean and Geoffroy. Although *Papa* died when Jean was four, he managed to serve with many of his father’s old army buddies.

Bouciquaut’s richest heritage was a name well-remembered at court. Charles V was careful with his heir’s education, and placed the sons of his best soldiers and courtiers in the entourage of the young prince. Among these was Bouciquaut, who, Lalande suggests, profited greatly from sharing the prince’s education. Subsequent events bear this out.

From a young age our hero showed a dominating personality, with an aggressive ambition for knighthood and warfare. Louis, duc de Bourbon, one of Charles’ four brothers, helped his career early and often. At age 12, he obtained leave from the king himself to accompany “le Bon Duc” as a page on the 1378 Normandy campaign. His biographer tells how he delighted in being able for the first time to go “armed as well as he could desire.” Coupled with the fact that he was small of stature even when full grown, this lends perspective to child-size suits of armor. Far from equipping himself out of the 500 francs a year he inherited, he was beholden to his sponsors, the king and the duke. He was able to witness strategems for reducing strongholds at first hand, and approach the greatest warriors of the age, especially du Guesclin, then in his last years.

Two years later, Thomas Woodstock, Earl of Buckingham, led a chevauchée from Calais through the northeast of France ending up in Brittany. Bouciquaut thus witnessed the last campaign in the battle-avoidance policy of Charles the Wise, rubbing elbows with the king’s top generals and closest advisors. But their triumphal return to Paris was cut off by the king’s death. Six weeks later, in November 1380, Bouciquaut’s boyhood companion was crowned. Both were still minors.

The next spring he accompanied Louis de Sancerre, marshal of France, on an expedition in the south-west. Lalande says De Sancerre had fought alongside Bouciquaut *pere* many times, especially against the Great Companies. It was on this campaign that Bouciquaut gained his reputation for physical ability, climbing scaling ladders from the back using only his hands, and leaping clear over a horse or onto the shoulders of another man –all in full armor– at age 15.

At 16, in 1382, he was knighted by Bourbon on the eve of Roosebeke, a battle controversial for the unfurling of the Oriflamme against rebellious Flemish townsmen. There, his biographer reports, he performed in a manner befitting his new rank. When the army disbanded, the king left Olivier de Clisson, constable of France, in charge of the frontier guard. Characteristically, his biographer tells us, when the rest of the king’s young entourage –“les enfants tendres”– returned to Paris, Bouciquaut wintered with Clisson, a veteran who had fought on the English side.

In January 1384, a state of truce existing with the English, Bouciquaut went crusading, responding to the recruitment of Zoellner de Rottenstein, grand-master of Teutonic knights in Prussia. The enemy was the pagan prince Jagellon of Lithuania, and the campaigns were in winter because one could traverse streams and bogs better when solid. Bouciquaut returned to Paris in spring, attended the princes to the peace conference at Boulogne, and went back to Prussia in September. This time

the western allies were successful and Bouciquaut returned to Paris in January ’85.

He was in time to help prepare for Bourbon’s campaign in Poitou (southwest) where French lords were complaining of English-sponsored harrassment. The campaign took most of the summer and culminated in the seige of Verteuil, which capitulated about the end of September. The duke returned to Paris, leaving 250 men under the command of several young knights, including Bouciquaut, Jean de Chateaumorand and Renaud de Roye. This little army set forth to take other strongholds complained of by the men of Poitou. Passing through the Auvergne, Bouciquaut challenged a renowned Gascon, Sicart de la Barde, to jousts, and according to his biographer, took all the honors.

In the spring of 1386, the largest French army assembled in that era gathered in Picardy to invade England. Bouciquaut had command of a company of 100 men-at-arms. While the army waited for favorable conditions, Bouciquaut challenged and jousted with Peter de Courtenay, an English knight of good family. His challenge to Thomas Clifford being frowned on by his king, Bouciquaut accepted the Captain of Calais, the uncle of his adversary, as judge for the encounter. Both encounters were advertised by the anonymous biographer as favorable to Bouciquaut.

The army was disbanded without action at the end of July. That same month, king Charles sent troops under du Guesclin and Pierre de Villaines to support the king of Castile against the duke of Lancaster, who was invading from Portugal in the name of his wife, daughter of Pedro the Cruel. 2000 more troops went in early 1387, and Louis de Bourbon followed with 400, including our hero and his friend Chateaumorand. But when they got to Valencia, they found their journey pointless: Lancaster had retreated. Trying to make the most of their travel, they returned by way of Navarre, where Bouciquaut experienced the brilliant court of Gaston, Comte de Foix, made much of by Froissart. Contrary to some reports, he did not joust there. Continuing north, the duke’s little army recaptured a few small strongholds along the Guyenne frontier from English truce-breakers before returning to Paris in October.

Bouciquaut then went on pilgrimage to the Holy Land with Renaud de la Roye, the first of several companions labeled by Lalande as his “devoted friend.” As chamberlains in his household, they were allowed 1000 francs each by the king for the journey. The first leg was to Venice, where they embarked for Constantinople. From there, about February 1388, they obtained safe-conducts to visit the Ottoman Sultan Murad I, then near Gallipoli. After three months at his court, through June, they obtained an escort through Bulgaria to the Danube and Hungary. They stayed at the court of King Sigismond for three months, Bouciquaut promising to return come winter and help him fight the Margrave of Moravia. Renaud headed for Prussia while Bouciquaut went to Venice to embark for Palestine. His visit to the Holy Places in January 1389 went without incident, but after his baggage was already embarked for Prussia, he heard that a member of the French royal family was under arrest at Damascus. It was Phillipe d’Artois, the Comte d’Eu, descended from the brother of St. Louis, and he was being transferred to Cairo. According to Lalande, Bouciquaut did not hesitate to join the Count in his Cairo imprisonment. This lasted four months, ending through the intervention of the Venetian consul with the Sultan. Then Bouciquaut joined his new friend on his tour of the holy places before they returned to France via Cyprus, Rhodes and Venice.

During their imprisonment, Phillipe d’Artois (Comte d’Eu), Jean de Sainte-Pierre (seneschal d’Eu), Bouciquaut, and Jean de Crésecque collaborated on a work called *Les Cent Ballades*, which comprised a question on courtly love and various answering opinions. In the work, Bouciquaut took

the side of loyalty in love, although since most of the writing was by the Count, we can point to no passages definitely by Bouciquaut. On their return to France in October, the work was offered to the court as a challenge that was taken up by no less than 30 courtiers including the duc de Berri. This gave the four companions' reputations a courtly gloss.

This occurred during the king's south-of-France tour, where he was attempting to correct the damage done by the regime of his uncle the duc de Berri. He also attended the Avignon coronation of Louis II d'Anjou as king of Sicily and Jerusalem. Executing a couple of the duc's officers on the way home, the king returned to Paris at the end of February 1390.

During that same tour, Bouciquaut, Renaud de Roye and Jean de Sempey issued a general challenge, offering to hold a "pas d'armes" for 30 days against all comers with weapons of war or peace. The royal council, which could strongly influence royal decisions, were not amused, rightly assuming that unless things went well, the king's image would suffer. Since the three were members of his household, and dependent on him for their livelihood, his approval would amount to sponsorship. Some pointed out that two of the three young knights were small of stature and the third but mediocre, to which they responded with fierce references to David and Goliath. In the end the young king gave his permission, and the thing was set for the following spring (1390) for a spot near Calais, very convenient for the English who were the primary targets of the invitation. For 30 days at St. Inglevert, the three took on about a hundred mostly-English challengers. Froissart gave it lance-by-lance coverage.

Most of the challengers chose combats "à l'outrance" ("to the end") with weapons of war. For 9 of the 30 days, say Les Religieux de St. Denis, Bouciquaut was bedridden from wounds, unable to fight, but the other sources don't mention it. (This part of Froissart's *Chronique* is available in English.) Froissart also asserts the young king himself came, incognito, to watch one day's jousting. At any rate he made sure it was well funded, with 500 francs d'or before the event and 2000 f. to each of the young heroes afterwards. Much of it went to the rich tentage and provisions for all comers, and rich gifts given to many of the venans after the jousts, in addition to returning the harnesses won from their adversaries. The event was celebrated in ballades and their names became proverbs for prowess in France for long after.

Soon after, still in 1390, came Louis de Bourbon's celebrated expedition to "Barbary." In spite of his duties as chamberlain to the king, Bouciquaut counted on going along, but the king held him back while his brother Geoffroy went. Thus, Geoffroy has to be the "Sir Bouciquaut the younger" in Froissart's tale of a challenge given by a Saracen "knight" to any ten Crusaders and of how the Sieur de Coucy put the kibosh to the plan. Barbara Tuchman's assertion that the idea for Bouciquaut's votive order came from a vision of a white lady seen on this campaign in the sky near Tunis would seem to be based on a misidentification of Geoffroy as Jehan II.

Later in the year, our hero consoled himself by returning to Prussia for more fighting, a year later than he had promised. There he was joined by his brother, back from Barbary, and the two lingered, hoping for more employment at arms. Since service in households, even royal ones, did not constitute year-round employment, they were literally free-lancing. After a brief trip back toward France at news of war in Italy, the two joined Sempey back in Prussia where war was brewing more intensely since Lithuania and Poland were now joined against the Teutonic Knights. Among the many who came from all Christian lands was a Scottish lord, William Douglas of Nithsdale, brother of the Earl

of Douglas. William was killed in a brawl with the English while Bouciquaut was there. In keeping with the Franco/Scottish alliance, Bouciquaut challenged the killer but could not get him to fight. A successful campaign against the heathen ensued during which Bouciquaut raised his personal banner for the first time.

In 1391, while Bouciquaut was out East, one of the two Marshals of France died. Bouciquaut was only 25, but, overruling his council, the king preferred him for the Marshal's baton over more experienced men. He replaced the man who had replaced his father. The post was his first steady job, but paid yearly only 2000 francs, the amount Bouciquaut won in February 1383 from the duc d'Orleans playing ***tennis***. Still, aside from the royal family, he was now one of the three top military men of the kingdom.

In June 1392, a murderous attack on the aging constable Olivier de Clisson, instigated by Jean de Montfort, led to a campaign into Brittany. It was on that expedition that the king's first episode of madness happened, and it cut short the trip. But just before the incident, Bouciquaut was appointed Captain-General for Poitou, Berry, Auvergne, and all the Berry lands in Guyenne. This was no sinecure: Guyenne, the Aquitaine, technically French but for much of the war under English rule. It was Bouciquaut's task to firm up French rule in his bailiwick and chase the marauding Gascons from their strongholds. (MAP) Taking le Roc d'Ussac by seige, he returned to Paris for the winter.

There, he narrowly escaped the flames at the famous Bal des Ardents, where four companions of the king, in costumes stuck to them with pitch and wax, were accidently burned to death.

That same winter, his friend the Comte d'Eu succeeded Clisson as Constable of France. The summer of '93 saw the two joined on a mission with the other marshal, Louis de Sancerre, in the southwest against renegade Gascons. It didn't come to much.

On Christmas eve, Bouciquaut married Antoinette de Turenne, one of the richest heiresses in Provence. How that came about is a complex story. Antoinette's father was Raymond-Louis de Turenne, described by Lalande as an "ambitious and turbulent" adventurer employing routiers and bandits who engaged in pillage and massacre. He had been at war since 1386 with Clement VII, not surprisingly since the Roman pope was his uncle, and more recently with Marie de Blois. This lady was Queen of Naples and Sicily, but more to the point, duchess of Anjou and countess of Provence. When Bouciquaut entered the picture, she had all but arranged for her son Charles, Prince of Tarente, to marry Antoinette, having the approval of pope Clement and the girl's grandfather. The king approved of the idea that the vast Turenne domains would fall into the hands of the Angevin dynasty and Raymond's agitation of Provence would end. He even sent the duc de Bourbon to help. But Raymond absolutely rejected the Angevin princeling.

Enter the dukes of Burgundy and Berry to foil the Angevin plan. The two dukes managed to convince everyone that Bouciquaut as bridegroom could bring peace, law and order to the embattled region. Bouciquaut played the docile beneficiary of their plot, which would seem to place him in opposition to his great benefactors Bourbon and the king. Raymond went along with it enthusiastically, setting conditions whereby Bouciquaut would help him get back his lost castles and offering a rich dowry of lands and castles also occupied by enemies. He sweetened the deal with an eventual swap of the dowry lands for the county and castle of Beaufort. The marriage contract included many more clauses intended to settle all the disputes in the region; for instance, the ducs Berry and Bur-

gundy were supposed to intervene for Raymond with Pope Clement. Bouciquaut and Antoinette, who by Lalande's calculations could not have been more than 17, were married on Christmas eve. Bouciquaut consummated the marriage by setting off with his father-in-law right after the ceremony to recapture castles and lands.

Counting on him to recover Charlus, Montredon, and Champagnac in the Auvergne, which the duc de Berry had agreed to release in his favor, Raymond gave Bouciquaut a loosely-worded procuration document that allowed him to lift *all* of Raymond's castles for himself.

The Estates of Provence met in February 1394 to consider how to proceed against Raymond's bandits, and appointed, of all people, Charles de Tarente to lead the war. In April, pope Clement issued a bull reinstating all the sentences previously passed against Raymond as a despoiler of the church. Marie de Blois refused to give up any of Raymond's castles she held. In short, over the next six years Raymond found himself royally duped out of every piece of land he had held, and everyone but his wife and his bandits smiled. Bouciquaut profited hugely, doing homage to Marie de Blois for the Comté de Beaufort-en-Vallee. Raymond wound up a fugitive under capital sentence and died about 1411. As far as can be told, Antoinette smiled too.

The Avignon Anti-Pope Clement VII's death in September 1394 offered a way to end the Schism. The French royal council despatched royal messengers post-haste to the cardinals with an exhortation not to elect a successor. Led by Bouciquaut, the little expedition broke all speed records, arriving in just four days, but for nothing. The conclave was already electing Benedict (Benoit) XIII, who had claimed it would be as easy to abdicate as to take off his hat. The French court supported him on that condition, but he put off everything but his papal hat for the rest of his life, which turned out to be decades.

In 1395, Emperor Sigimund of Hungary, under increasing pressure from the Turks, appealed to the western monarchies for help. For once, as David Nicolle put it in his study of the campaign, the secular nobles led this last crusade and the popes tagged behind. Bouciquaut brought 17 gentlemen to the Burgundian contingent nominally led by the 24-year-old Comte de Nevers, son of the Duke of Burgundy, but advised by the veteran Enguerrand de Coucy. Once in Hungary, the Allies wanted to do more than shore up Sigismund, preferring an invasion of Turk-held territory without much definition but headed in the general direction of beleaguered Constantinople.

By mid-1396, the campaign was headed down the Danube from Budapesht into Turk-held territory. (MAP) After initial success, in which Bouciquaut distinguished himself and 3,000 Turks were taken prisoner, the campaign settled in to beseige Nicopolis, secure on its rock overlooking the Danube. The allies had brought no seige engines, a fact that Tuchman used to hold Bouciquaut up to knightly ridicule, quoting him as saying, in effect, no matter; ladders can be made on the spot and are worth more than seige trains when used by men of valor.* were trying to starve out the garrison when the Sultan Bajazet arrived to relieve it with a sizeable army. The suddenly-nervous allies killed their prisoners before going out to face the enemy on September 25. Their defeat was of legendary proportions. Many thousands scattered, many were drowned in the Danube trying to escape, and several thousands were trapped and surrendered, including the groups around Bouciquaut, Henri de

* This is where Tuchman, using an old edition of the biography, cites the Tunisian campaign, on which Bouciquaut did not serve, as the inspiration for his order of chivalry, which he had not yet founded, in contrast to what she implies.

Bar, the Comte de Nevers and the Sieur de Coucy. Sigismund and much of his army escaped via his supply fleet down the Danube.

After the battle, the Sultan discovered the 3000 massacred Turks, and in a rage decided to behead a similar number of *his* prisoners. He required the few surviving French commanders to witness the process, and the Comte de Nevers, who would grow up to be Jean Sans Peur (John the Fearless), spotted Bouciquaut in the queue. The count begged on his knees for Bouciquaut's life. It was granted. Lalande doesn't argue, as other historians have done, with the *Livre des fais'* report that 3000 knights and esquires were beheaded. Nicolle suggests the actual number could have been anywhere from 300 to 3000. The total French forces have been estimated to have been about 16,000.

Bouciquaut and the other noble prisoners were marched over 200 miles to imprisonment in Gallipoli [MAP] and neighboring towns. Three months passed before even the hope of ransom could appear. On Christmas Day, their letters reached the court in Paris, and the fund-raising began. The ambassadors sent to arrange Genoa's submission also asked for help with ransoms. In January 1397, Bouciquaut was paroled to seek help at Enez, a Genoese outpost near Gallipoli. The Genoese local lord stood parole for the Comte de Nevers, but in spite of all it was another year before he and Bouciquaut, with only eight of the many French nobles who had set forth, got home. Henri de Bar, the Comte d'Eu, the Sieur de Coucy, among others, had died awaiting ransom.

Bouciquaut arrived 1 Nov. 1397 to find that the death of his friend the Comte d'Eu made him First Marshal while de Sancerre moved up to Constable. In May 1398, he was assigned, on behalf of the duc d'Orleans, to pry the condemned Archambaud VI, Comte de Perigord out of his stronghold of Montignac. Two previous expeditions, in 1394 and 97, had failed to bring the previous Count under law. Montignac was on a high pointy rock in a river bend, with the land side protected by a deep ditch and high walls flanked by large towers. Assault by ladders failing, Bouciquaut blockaded the place and gathered all the seige engines he could find, including one that could throw 89 three-hundred-pound missles in 24 hours. They reduced the place in two months. Archambaud VI went under the protection of the duc de Berry and his surviving troops were allowed to leave. Bouciquaut kept his army in the southwest the rest of the year to keep brigands and the English from taking advantage of the Count's absence. The Count was condemned to banishment and the Perigord became an appanage of the duc d'Orleans. Archambaud fled to England and served two kings there.

Bouciquaut was home only briefly before being sent east again in 1399, this time to relieve Constantinople, which, since Nicopolis, was in greater danger. (MAP) Freed from any western threat, the Turks blockaded by sea, starving the population. The Emperor Manuel appealed to France and Venice for help and both promised it. Bouciquaut was assigned to this task before the end of March, and assembled 400 men at arms, 400, armed valets and a number of archers. While Bouquicaut had travelled by sea several times, this was his first sea command. In that period, before the rise of actual navies and while sea battles were mostly hand-to-hand affairs, generals and captains were expected to command at sea as well as on land. His fleet of four ships and two galleys weighed anchor at Aigues-Mortes on 24 June. Arriving in the Bosporus, Bouciquaut's group defeated a larger blockading naval force, raided the Turkish coastal towns for food, burned several towns and destroyed a castle on the Black Sea, burned a Turkish fleet, and settled one of those Byzantine internecine disputes. All in about eight months. For Constantinople, this seemed to be no

more than a reprieve. Emperor Manuel wanted a state visit to the French court in order to beg for more help, and asked Bouciquaut to arrange it. Leaving his lieutenant Jehan de Chastieaumorant in charge, he returned to France to prepare the court for the visit. He was now a certifiable military hero.

By now, April 1400, the effects of the Nicopolis disaster had set in. Widowed and orphaned ladies beseiged the French court for help against marauders –and even close neighbors– who found their estates easy pickings. Bouciquaut's reaction was the founding of his votive order of chivalry, l'Escu Vert a la Dame Blanche to espouse the cause, and allowed twelve friends to join him, including Messire Charles d'Alebret, cousin-german to the king. The thirteen pledged to accept challenges to jousts within certain rules typical of votive orders, but always putting first the protection of ladies and damoiselles against depredations. They would wear on their sleeves the badge of the white lady in the green shield for five years.

In 1401, Bouciquaut participated in the Cour Amoreuse or Court of Love sponsored by the ducs Bourbon and Burgundy. That same year, he was appointed Governor of Genoa, only brought under French rule a few years previously. Genoa was a city-state with sea power and colonies from Monaco into the Black Sea (MAP). For much of the previous century it had been a republic, but in the 1390s its people had decided to ask the French king to take over its administration. The first few governors were not a success. In 1400, having expelled their third in five years, the Genoese elected a dictator who was no better. The Genoese, many of whom had seen Bouciquaut in action in the Constantinople affair, now requested him as governor. He was appointed in May 1401 and formally entered in October, energetically asserting a strong government in disregard of the Genoese constitution, executing the former dictator, disarming the populace and instituting punishments for Ghibelline-Guelf conflict as harsh as loss of a hand. Things seem to have gone well enough that in eight months it was safe enough to move Antoinette in.

Bouciquaut then turned his attention to the Genoese holdings in the Levant, sending a team of inspectors. On Cyprus, the king Janus had just begun beseiging the Genoese seaports, and after a 1402 diplomatic mission failed, Bouciquaut sailed in person with a fleet. This made the Venetian senate nervous; they dispatched a fleet to shadow him. He actually had two missions: to subdue Janus and to get revenge on the Turks for Nicopolis. The first part was easy; reports vary on how successful he was with the second. While he was in the eastern Mediterranean in July 1402, Emperor Manuel passed enroute back to Constantinople, and about that same time came news of the battle of Ancyre, in which Tamerlane defeated Bazajet and took the pressure off Constantinople.

Bouciquaut's fleet stayed in the eastern Mediterranean for a year, and after several raids on Turkish coastal sites, sacked Beyruit on August 10, 1403, cleaning out stores belonging to Venetian merchants. This tipped the scale for the Venetian fleet captain, Carlo Zeno, who closed on the Genoese fleet as it sailed for home. Bouciquaut turned on them and the sea battle of Modon ocurred on 7 Octobre 1403. After four vicious hours, the two fleets disengaged, the Venetians getting the better result without being able to declare a clear victory, with the Genoese losing 600 men not counting prisoners on two captured galleys, which included Bouciquaut's "right arm," Jean de Chastieaumorand. Bouciquaut returned to Genoa with only five of the galleys with he had started with, capturing an unarmed Venetian ship on the way.

The incident led to much argument and resentment. Bouciquaut wanted to declare war, but was

constrained by his king out of concern for the prisoners, and in about seven months peace was made and they were freed in May 1404. That done, Bouciquaut sent a personal challenge to combat to the Venetian leaders he held responsible for the conflict. The challenge was ignored and peace was signed in 1406.

Meanwhile, on the death of Giangalleazzo Visconti, duke of Milan, Pisa was left to his natural son, Gabriel, who sought French protection. He did homage in April 1404 to Charles VI, who promised to send some troops. Shortly thereafter, the Florentines, nervous about French power over a territory they regarded as in their sphere, plotted a takeover. Bouciquaut was alerted and gave notice that he would defend Pisa, following up with a series of negotiations with the warlike parties on either side and achieving a treaty that was supposed to last four years.

It didn't. Bouciquaut was giving strong support to Benedict XIII's drive to become the only Pope. Perhaps too strong; he was believed to be ready to escort Benedict into Rome by force. Bouciquaut, trying to persuade all three states to accept Benedict, undermined his own reputation in Genoa as well as in Pisa and Florence. Benedict couldn't raise enough support; Charles VI, for a time sane, vetoed the armed approach and Benedict switched to intrigue, offering the Florentines another chance at Pisa in exchange for their allegiance. In short, France sold Pisa to Florence. Bouciquaut was caught in the middle, having promised what, as the agent of France, he was now obliged to withhold. His price included Florentine support of Benedict and 126,000 florins for Gabriel's rights, for which Florence would do homage each year in the form of a white palfrey. In France's name, Bouciquaut would retain possession of a the Pisan stronghold of Livorno. The deal was signed in August 1405. Things only got worse. The Pisans revolted in September and the Florentines laid seige, asking the French to guard Livorno. By February 1406, the Pisans were desperate enough to sell themselves to any magnate powerful enough to protect them. Finally, in July, Jean sans Peur, Duke of Burgundy, agreed, and the Burgundian banner rose over their citadel. Burgundy asked Bouciquaut to reverse his forces and fight off the Florentines, who had already paid him good money for Pisa. The king added his orders to do so, but Bouciquaut delayed, saying he would engage the Florentines if the duc de Bourbon did. Jean sans Peur wrote an angry letter threatening grave consequences in his own name and that of the duc d'Orleans, but Bouciquaut, between a rock and a hard place, didn't move much. In October, the Pisans finally gave up and the Florentine troops marched in. In spite of the threats, Bouciquaut remained Governor of Genoa, but Burgundy and Orleans were vengeful, throwing Florentine merchants in prison, followed by the abassadors that came to explain their position. Bouciquaut reminded the Florentines that Pisa was still supposed to be under Avignon obedience, and their dismissive response was a reality check for Bouciquaut, who realized all this was not good for the Genoese –or, perhaps, for him. From March 1407 onward, his allegiance shifted away from the Florentines, and in May he signed an oath of allegiance, saving the crown, to Jean Sans Peur.

It was also that year that Bouciquaut, encouraged by Raymond de Lescure, Knights-Hospitaler Grand Prior of Toulouse, and still possessed by the Crusading spirit, or perhaps still seeking satisfaction for Nicopolis, concocted a scheme to attack Alexandria. It needed the help of Janus, king of Cyprus, and his hesitation ended the idea for the time.

Mid-1407 saw the end of the controversy among the French royals as to the Schism. All now agreed it should end, and a council was proposed where the two popes would both abdicate and a

new one be elected. The two popes agreed to meet in Savona, closer to France than Genoa. Bouciquaut was supposed to play a key role by providing safeguards for the Roman pope Gregory XII, with the French crown financing and guaranteeing everything. It was set for autumn 1407. Bouciquaut got Benedict XIII as far as Portovenere, but Gregory stalled at Lucca, still within the Roman obedience. One can scarcely blame him. Given that less than a year before, Bouciquaut was believed ready to bring Benmedict to Rome by force, Gregory must have regarded him as the fox assigned to guard the hen-house.

While the popes stalled, the French world was rocked by the November 23 street murder of the Duc d'Orleans by agents of Jean sans Peur, the event which started the Orleanist-Armagnac feud which undermined what little solidarity France would have in the face of the rising threat from England.

The popes had maneuvered in place for six months, to everyone else's digust, when things were kicked forward by Ladislas Durazzo, king of Naples, who proceeded to take Rome and on April 25 set up housekeeping in the Vatican. Charles VI pressured Benedict by listening to suggestions that France go neutral; Benedict promised to excommunicate anyone who withdrew obedience; and Bouciquaut received orders to secure the person of Benedict. Things fell apart quickly; nine cardinals abandoned Gregory. Benedict asked Bouciquaut for safe-conducts for the hostages he was supposed to be leaving behind. His plan obvious, Bouciquaut refused. Benedict's galley weighed anchor anyway and Bouciquaut lifted no hand to stop him. Gregory left too. A year later, the Council of Pisa would depose both and elect another, which resulted in three popes instead of two.

By looking the other way for Benedict, Bouciquaut had now flouted high French interests twice in the same year. Why he took this risk may have involved family interests. Benoit owed Bouciquaut's brother a considerable sum, and apparently had assigned him the income of a town near Avignon for the money. To this day, the town of Pernes-les-Fontaines has a "Festival Bouciquaut" commemorating Geoffroi le Meingre's ten-year reign of terror over the community. Geoffroy was Governor of the Dauphiné from 1399 to 1407.

In late 1408, the biography says Bouciquaut took a short vacation to visit his lands in Provence as well as his wife. On the way, it says, he fought off four Moorish barks which attacked his ship. This should not be considered a gratuitously-added story of heroism; at this period Tunisian-based pirates were taking prizes not only in the Mediterranean but as far away as the English Channel. Bouciquaut would have been a major prize and consquently would have traveled in force.

At the end of the year, he became part of an "anti-Facino Cane league," as a result of which he became regent to Milan for the young duke GianMaria Visconti, and sent 1200 troops (provided by Bourbon) there under Chastiaumorant.

When Bouciquaut first took over Genoa, his aggressive tactics won him good reviews, but soon the old conflicts began to resurface. Bouciquaut's regime seems to have sided with the Guelphs. In 1403, the Ghibellines plotted with a condottiere to expel the French overlordship. In 1405, the Pisans had attempted to rouse the Genoese against the French. In 1406, the Florentines foiled an anti-French plot by expatriate Genoese and Pisans. In 1408 a serious plot was uncovered between Gabriel Maria Visconti, formerly of Pisa, and an exiled Ghibelline, Facino Cane, to take Genoa by strategem. Visconti, natural son of the late Duke of Milan, was executed in December. This provoked an uproar. In early 1409, high-ranking Genoese clerics wrote to the French king asking that Bouciquaut be

replaced, calling him “the worst of tyrants” and much more.

Shortly after, in April 1409, Bouciquaut’s biographer wraps up his narrative and end the book with discussions of Bouciquaut’s morals and mode of life. Helène Millet speculates that the manuscript, undecorated as it still is, was deliberately circulated at the French court to defend and raise support for all Bouciquaut was doing in Italy.

Bouciquaut’s expedition to Milan in mid-1409 was supposed to be the first step in Louis II of Anjou’s plan to take the kingdom of Naples from his rival Ladislas Durazzo, who had taken Rome two years before. Bouciquaut left Genoa July 31 with 5500 mounted and 600 infantry, took Tortona, crossed the Po, stopped at Pavia, and entered Milan about August 29. He was recognized as Governor and set out to stabilize the place against imminent Ghibelline counterattacks.

The attack he didn’t foresee was the the most devastating of his career so far. Facino Cane was back, with the Marquis de Monferrat. They gathered montagnards and waited their moment outside Genoa while Bouciquaut was entering Milan. When the commander of the remaining French garrison decided to move from the palace to the fortress, he was killed in the street along with another knight. The small garrison was holed up in two strongholds, but that was not enough to hold Genoa. The Ancients met and offered Monferrat the city to govern and Facino 30,000 florins to leave. Several days after his triumphal entry, the towns under Genoa’s sway threw off their French overlords also. Facino left, doing his best to block Bouciquaut’s return. That began as soon as the news got to Milan. He was attacked twice on the trip and took up position at Gavi with his 5000 troops, only to move several more times looking for stronger positions.

In March 1410, Bouciquaut’s confessor and close associate Nicolas de Gonesse went to Paris for help, returning with royal promises. On his return, he found his predecessor as Bouciquaut’s confessor, now Bishop of Savone, had been tortured and was now held in a cage for having plotted to reinstate Bouciquaut in power. Bouciquaut had to sell or pawn his plate and even his wife’s jewels to remain in the field. Money finally came, too little too late. The Mareschal hung around Lombardy until November 10, when he got the order to return to France. French rule in Genoa had lasted less than 15 years and was never regained. Nor was Bouciquaut’s fortune.

Bouciquaut is reported as at his chateau of Alais from Nov 29-Dec 29.

He returned to the court at the beginning of 1411, broke and beseiged by creditors from Paris to Lombardy. In spite of repeated interventions by the king himself, Bouciquaut waited until November for any payment, and then received only half of his expenses. Meanwhile the Orleans/Armagnac feud was getting worse.

Bouciquaut was sent to give the king’s peace demands to his old friend and present lord, the duke of Burgundy. Had the duke of Orleans agreed, there could have been peace. But it was war. The king stripped the duc de Berri of his lieutenancies for siding with the Orleanists, which led to conflict in Languedoc. In February 1413, the king commissioned Bouciquaut to secure and consolidate French rule of Languedoc and Guyenne. (MAP) He wasted no time. By 28 May he had a truce signed with the Counts of Foix and Armagnac, which kept the peace through the following Christmas. Later in the year, the king reinstated Berry, who made Bouciquaut his Captain-General for the region.

In 1414, the war with England looked grim. The king raised more taxes; the Duke of Burgundy, now on the English side, sent agents to encourage tax revolts. It worked especially well in the southwest, centering on Carcassonne, where the citizens blocked the streeets with chains. Bouciquaut took

action. Rounding up the ringleaders, he had one of them beheaded, turned the rest over to local authority, and imposed strict penalties on the city.

In autumn 1415, Bouciquaut and his Escu-Vert brother, Messire d'Albret, shared command of the French detachment that shadowed the English army to Azincourt. In 1990, a battle plan for Azincourt was found that some attribute to Bouciquaut.

At the battle itself, in spite of being one of the two commanding generals, Bouciquaut was in the front lines of the second wave of French knights who dismounted and slogged through the mud to attack the English in their hedges. At the time he was captured, he had reason to believe the French third wave would overwhelm the exhausted English, and he would be freed. A cry went up that the French had reinforcements coming, and King Henry ordered all but the most valuable prisoners to be slain. But the third wave of French troops never came. According to Desmond Seward, the remaining French men-at-arms, horrified by the butchery, rode off the field.{ June 1, 2008 addendum: Another source --probably Rogers or one of his contributors -- says that Henry sent a message to the remaining French command saying that if the third wave came, the French prisoners would be executed on the spot. The French then rode off. } Once again Bouciquaut escaped execution as a prisoner and was marched, with the duc de Bourbon, Charles of Orleans and 1300 others, to Calais and sent to England.

He was never able to negotiate a ransom. Of his movable wealth, he had left all but a few items in Genoa and spent the rest on his army in the field. A charter of 1416, signed by Antoinette and reaffirming his title to her lands during his lifetime could have been designed to gain him credit for a parole. After her death a day or so later, lacking a direct heir, her family blocked Bouciquaut from any further rights to the Turenne lands. Still, he was able to scrape together enough promises to offer 60,000 gold ecus, 40,000 on liberation and 20,000 later, but Henry V rejected it in spite of a strong appeal from the Pope, who backed it with a promise of employment for Bouciquaut. He died, still a prisoner in England, in 1421, aged 55, leaving his Book of Hours to his brother Geoffroy, his clothes to his squire, and not much else.

He was buried in the town of his birth, behind the choir at St. Martin de Tours, near his father's tomb. Antoinette de Turenne's body was moved and re-interred next to him. His brother Geoffroi carried on the line, leaving two sons, Jean and Geoffroy le Meingre, but the name died with them.

It is tempting to compare Bouciquaut's life against the standards of his peers, expressed for the previous generation in Geoffroy de Charney's book on chivalry, or against the example of his king, Jean II. Charles V "the wise," whom Bouciquaut's father also served, is also extolled as a fine example whose tactics in war emphasized the opposite of vainglory. De Charney's book emphasized loyalty, leadership, steadfastness, and especially mesure, that quality of even-handedness, proportion and stewardship of resources. But Tuchman brings us up short, pointing out that Bouciquaut's generation seemed to have quickly forgotten the lessons of Charles V, and never to have learned those of de Charney, aside from the calls for courage and physical prowess. These, however, were neither new with de Charney nor special knightly virtues in the first place. They were entry-level minimums, without which you couldn't joust, let alone scale enemy ramparts in armor.

We must also take into account the changes in the structure of chivalric society that were still taking place in Bouciquaut's time, especially the shift from feudal loyalties through a transitional phase into the new age of loyalty to the crown, and through it, to the developing nation-states. If the Hundred Years War was fought on the rationale of feudal rights, it certainly engendered a sense of national conflict among many participants. During the king's minority, loyalty would often be rendered to an abstraction represented sometimes by the king, sometimes by other members of the royal family, and sometimes by the royal council.

Name issues

Our hero's name contains not one, but two nicknames, one of them already evolved into usage as a surname, and another not so evolved in Bouciquaut's time but used as such in error by many modern scholars including Tuchman and the curators of Musée Jacquemart-Andre. You will find him referred to as "the Sire de Boucicaut," and as "the Mareschal de Boucicaut" and "Jean le Meingre de Boucicaut" in respected works on manuscript illumination. Similar attributions occur in various historical works. Tuchman also refers to Jean II's brother as "Geoffrey Boucicaut" as if it were a surname. I surmise that these errors come from misreading Froissart, who refers to "Sieur" Boucicault. Still, Bouciquaut was a nickname, not yet a surname and certainly not a lordship. The French sources are clear and unanimous: "dit Bouciquaut" means "called Bouciquaut," whereas "de Bourbon," means "of Bourbon." Geoffrey signed himself as "Bouciquaut son frere,"which means nothing more or less than "Bouciquaut's brother."

While we are sure that Bouciquaut was only a nickname, albeit an inherited one, "le Maingre" sounds like one too, but seems to have functioned as a surname. Lalande refers to "les le Maingre" ("the le Maingre family,") and Bouciquaut used it as readily as the nickname. The "le" construction suggests a by-name. Based on medieval usages, "Maingre" could indicate nationality ("Greek hand"), origin (Maine, just northwest of Tours), or a personal characteristic ("strong hand"). According to Lalande, the le Maingre family came from around Touraine. Since Maine lies just northwest of Tours, I lean toward the place-name theory.

In his earlier study of the nickname "Bouciquaut," Lalande says the name's roots suggest "baskets" or "panniers," as in "loot," implying "wealth before honor." But if the name amounted to baggage, it would seem there was more respect than anything else in it: he and his brother both used it for all it was worth.

The meaning of St. Inglevert

Bouciquaut's apparent knight-errantry serves primarily to distract the eye from his determined and systematic schooling for military command and a life of knightly endeavor. The St. Inglevert jousts, planned by the young Bouciquaut himself for the previous two years, were anything but frivolous. They were aimed squarely at the English chivalry. They required royal permission and were scheduled well into a period of truce. Further, they were deliberately held less than ten leagues from Calais, where the English could day-trip it. They offered jousts of both war and peace, with every expectation that the English would choose the former. Paradoxically, such a joust was probably the best insurance policy Bouciquaut could have purchased. The camaraderie of such a meeting –in fact

a declared purpose – would be strong, and the mutual respect engendered would almost guarantee good treatment in the event of capture by such enemies. The numbers were not trivial either. Over a hundred English knights came to test the mettle of the French hosts, and went away well satisfied.

It is quite conceivable that the plan was approved by the French royal council in hopes that such mock warfare would lengthen and strengthen the peace.

The military ideal

Bouciquaut and his father were landless soldiers who followed the contemporary fashion of pursuing chivalric ideals while winning and spending wealth like landed nobility. Bouciquaut's genuine quest for wealth does not negate our search for genuine idealism; Huizinga reminds us that seeming contradictions were common in the fourteenth century. Grand chivalric gestures required wealth, and riches were the perquisite of those who placed their persons in danger for the common good. Avarice is another matter. Had Bouciquaut not spent wealth as fast as he won it, he would not only have been less effective as a commander, he would have lost any hope of being considered ideal.

Bouciquaut was trusted by the highest members of the court, even after his greatest defeats.

If Bouciquaut's career shows individual impetuousity in one place and caution in command in another, one need look no further than de Charney's advice for the key. De Charney makes it clear that knighthood should be given to the young, and that rash courage is the stuff of youth. He also expects the knight to give up rashness with his youth, maturing into a leader and strategist with an eye on the safety of his men and the long-term benefits of his campaigns. He defines knighthood in terms of devotion – to service of lord, king and God. He advises conditioning the body, and conserving one's resources. He demands mesure – doing each thing in the appropriate time and in appropriate degree, whether of speed or force.

Bouciquaut's youthful rashness seems almost cultivated for the sake of appearance. Like his father, he was never one to give away the store, even while trying to set an example of courage.

To my mind, Bouciquaut's genuine heroism came not in the famous smiling sun of St. Inglevert but in the last battle of his life. His dismounting and slogging through the rain and deep mud in the second wave with his men speaks to every ideal of de Charney. It would have seemed to him that there was nothing he could accomplish hanging around at the rear (except, as we can see in hindsight, make sure the third wave *did* come, and *win* the damn battle). He was almost 50, and one of the two generals of that army, yet he marched in full armor into the short-range hail of arrows and fought on foot in the front lines. As for allowing himself to be captured, de Charney would have done the same had he not been protecting the person of his king. Bouciquaut had every reason to expect that he would fight again, perhaps even the same day.

Les hommes Bouciquaut and women

Bouciquaut *père* was confronted, says Froissart, by four women each of whom he had told that he loved her best. He insisted that, on each occasion, he had believed his love for the woman he was addressing was supreme. Asked which he *now* loved best, he replied that that lady was not in the room. Bouciquaut fils, having saluted a group of women in a street of Genoa, was told they were prostitutes. He replied that he would rather salute a hundred prostitutes than fail in courtesy to one lady. The most important information here may be that he seemed not to know they were prostitutes.

He married Antoinette de Turenne in 1393. In his Book of Hours, commissioned ten years into the marriage, the couple is portrayed *as if* at the time of their wedding. One source asserts that Bouciquaut maltreated his wife, but Lalande points out that when Bouciquaut was in an English prison losing all hope of release, she reaffirmed Bouciquaut's life tenure of all her lands. That charter seems intended to prove his ability to pay ransom, something you would not expect of a wife looking to dump an undesired husband. That she was not put up to it by her relatives is strongly suggested by the fact that when she died a few days later, they moved to block any access by Bouciquaut to the Turenne lands and wealth, since he had tenure only for his lifetime and by virtue of the marriage.

A story dating from about 1405 tells how Jean's brother Geoffroy defended the honor of a lady being ill-used by another gentleman at court. Advancing on the man, he required him to marry the lady. When the fellow tripped in his retreat, Bouciquaut the Younger dragged him across the floor by his hair, berating him the while.

Heraldry

According to the Supplement to the Armorial of Navarre Herald (c. 1370, just after his birth), the arms listed for "Bouciquaut" – which he would inherit – were "Argent, an eagle employée gules, barbed and beaked azure. During his tenure as Governor of Genoa (c. 1403-6), he commissioned a comparatively unknown workshop to execute a book of hours now famous in the world of manuscript illumination. In that book, Bouiciquaut and his wife are shown in devotional poses with different coats of arms displayed above them and on their pries-dieu. A study of the painting reveals that orginally the Mareschal was shown wearing the arms described above, but was later overpainted with *Vert, under a chief argent, six bezants*, a device that seemed related to Bouciquaut's "money-bags" *nom-de-guerre*. (It could easily be read as "money, and in chief, money.") Similarly, his wife the Viscomtess de Turenne was originally painted with her married device, the arms of Turenne and Beaufort impaled with those of Bouciquaut, but that shield was overpainted with Bouciquaut and Poitiers impaled.

The confusing results are explained by the fact that long after Bouciquaut left the book to his brother Geoffroy, it fell into the hands of Diane de Poitiers, mistress of Henri II. The overpainted arms are those of Poitiers, and they were applied so as to leave at least one representation of each of the original blazons intact. That choice created some odd combinations from the point of view of an observing genealogist.

The original painter, Jacques Coene, long known only as "the Boucicaut Master," went on to do masterworks for some of the richest men of the French court, including the duke of Berry.

The biography's author

While several scholars, myself included, have been tempted to lay the manuscript at the door of Christine de Pizan, Millet accepts Lalande's demonstration that she could not have been its author, but disagrees with him in making a strong case for Nicolas de Gonasse, Bouciquaut's confessor and active in his inner circle of advisers at Genoa. Nicolas was born in the Laon diocese of a poor family but through dint of hard work and grants from magnates like les ducs d'Orleans and de Berry, slowly completed a course of education that brought him a bachelor's degree in 1396 and doctorate in 1403. He is best known for finishing up the translation from the Latin of a work by Valère Maxim begun in

1375 by Simon de Hesdin. He entered Bouciquaut's service probably around 1406, but the phrase is deceptive: Bouciquaut shared his services with the Avignon pope Benedict and with the church in general. In fact, the relationship suggests how Bouciquaut may have been led to get himself into so much trouble involving Benedict, Genoa, Pisa and Florence.

L'escu Vert à la Dame Blanche

While votive orders of chivalry are often dismissed as frivolous chivalric games, the circumstances suggest a more serious tone for l'Escu Vert. Nicopolis was a staggering blow to the French court and to Bouciquaut personally. While the Comte de Nevers and Louis de Bourbon survived, Enguerrand de Coucy, le Comte d'Eu and Henri de Bar did not, and while it is fairly certain that Bezajet did not behead 3,000 French knights, still only a tiny fraction returned of those who had set forth. The noble widows and orphans begging for assistance were real. Bouciquaut may have also felt some guilt for his share in the military errors that had led to defeat.

The badge devised was "a gold shield, enamelled in green, enclosing a white lady." The gold is the metal substrate, not part of the color scheme. It was to be worn tied around the arm. Lalande mentions that "if the white symbolises the widowed woman, the green is the color of love being born and full of hope,"[13] referring us to Huizinga's discussion of color symbolism.[14]

The whole document gives precedence to ladies' aid, although it specifies that if a lady asks for help while another challenge is active, the gentleman may choose which to do first. The order was intended to last 5 years. The biography states that the original, which has not come down to us, was signed and sealed by all thirteen: Messire Charles d'Alebret, Messire Bouciquaut Mareschal de France, Bouciquaut son frere (Geoffroy), Francois d'Aubissecourt, Jehan de Ligneres, Chambrillac, Castelbayac, Gaucourt, Chastiaumorant, Betas, Bonnebaut, Colleville, and Torsay.

Lalande identifies each of the members; Jehan de Ligneres (Liniéres) as probably Bouciquaut's cousin. Together, they tell us Bouciquaut won the loyalty of his knightly associates (most of those listed were his social superiors) to a remarkable degree. Most "votive" orders of chivalry were founded by counts and dukes. While Bouciquaut was still outside the landed noblesse, all but two of his signers were landed nobles, notably Messire d'Alebret, cousin-German to the king. Their willingness to join his order bespeaks great confidence in his reputation, which would inevitably rub off on each member. It also confirms his position in the court society relative to women: these men set their names to his charter and wore his green-shield badge, acts which essentially certify Bouciquaut as the rightful champion of women in the court of France of their time.

Knightly virtues and the nature of war.

We have discussed many of the virtues of the knight in the process of this essay, but have left out that of the keeping of one's word. In Bouciquaut's world, keeping one's word was no special virtue – it was a matter of survival. Without it, one could simply not be in business as a knight in warfare. Too much depended on it. Up until Azincourt, the ability to wage feudal war rested in part on the expectation that systems like truces and ransoms would work, and these depended on most people keeping their word. Without the safety net of ransoms, the sort of person willing to venture their

persons and fortunes in battles over points of inheritance would – and did – change considerably. It has been argued that Henry V brought a new, more total tone to the war he fought for the old feudal causes, and that, after Agincourt, the Hundred Years War shifted from a dynastic conflict into a national one.

Sources

Famiglietti, R.C., *Royal Intrigue*, NY, 1986.

Cotton, Joseph T., *Teaching Motifs of Chivalric Biography*, in *The Study of Chivalry, Resources and Approaches*, Western Michigan University

_____, *Livre des Faites de bon messire Jean II le Meingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*, ed. Denis LaLande, Geneva, 1985.

MS 11432, Biblioteque National, Paris. *Livre des Faites de bon messire Jean II le Meingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes.*

LaLande, Denis, *Jean II le Meingre, dit Bouciquaut,(1366-1421), etude d'une biographie héroique*, Geneva, 1988.

Millet, Helène, *Qui a ecrit Le livre des faits de bon messire Jehan le Maingre dit Bouciquaut?* in *Textes et etudes du Moyen Age: 2: Pratiques de la Culture Ecrit en France au XVe Siècle.* F.I.D.E.M., Louvain-le-Neuve, 1995.

Allmand, C. T., *Society at War: The Experience of England and France During the Hundred Years War*, Edinburgh 19__

Armorial de Héraut Navarre (c. 1370), ed. by L. Douët-d'Arcq (Choix pièces inédites?)

Heures du Mareschal de Boucicaut, Musée Jacquemart-Andre, Paris

Greimas, Algirdas Julien, *Dictionnaire de l'ancien francais: Le Moyen Age*, Paris, 1979

Froissart, Jean, *Chronicles* (greatly abridged), tr. Geoffrey Brereton, 1978, N.Y.

Froissart, Jean, *Chronique, (extraits)– Nouvelle approche*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Medeiros, 1988, Librairie General de Francaise

Joanot Martorell and Martí Joan de Galba, *Tirant lo Blanc*, first published in 1490, transl. from Catalan by David H. Rosenthal, New York, 1984.

Boulton, Jonathan D'Acre, *Knights of the Crown*, Woodbridge (Boydell)1987

Huizinga, Johan, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, English transl. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch, , pp. 326-7. Chicago, 1996.

Courteault, Henri, *Gaston IV, Comte de Foix: Vicomte Souverain de Bearn, Prince de Navarre, 1423-1472, Etude Historique*... Toulouse, 1895.

Leguai, Andre, *Les Ducs de Bourbon pendant le crise monarchique du XVe Siècle – contribution à l'étude des apanages*, Dijon, 1962.

Nicolle, David, *Nicopolis*, (Osprey), Oxford, 1999

Tuchman, Barbara, *A Distant Mirror, the Calamitous 14th Century*, N.Y., 1978

Curry, Anne, *The Battle of Agincourt, Sources and Interpretations*, Woodbridge (Boydell), 2000

Notes and Bibliography from a previous version, to be collated as appropriate. Some of the references were proved inappropriate by research completed after the notes had been appended but before the paper was read at Kalamazoo.

1. Alan Friedlander, Southern Connecticut State University, writing in _____ (a collection of reviews, copy of pages sent along by JMQ
2. given as Benoît XIII = Benedict.
3. Famiglietti, R.C., *Royal Intrigue*, NY, 1986.
4. Cotton, Joseph T., *Teaching Motifs of Chivalric Biography*, in *The Study of Chivalry, Resources and Approaches*, Western Michigan University
5. Famiglietti quotes a number of psychological researchers on the nature of Charles' disorder, which has been the subject of a number of retrospective analyses.
6. _____, *Livre des Faites de bon messire Jean II le Meingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*, ed. Denis LaLande, Geneva, 1985.
7. MS 14111, Biblioteque National, Paris. The date 1409 is inscribed in a later hand at the top of folio ___. This date is substantiated by the text itself, which declares itself complete as of April 1409 at the end.
8. LaLande, Denis, *Jean II le Meingre, dit Bouciquaut,(1366-1421), etude d'une biographie héroique*, Geneva, 1988.
9. Allmand, C. T., *Society at War: The Experience of England and France During the Hundred Years War*, Edinburgh 19__
10. Blazon modernized from *Armorial de Héraut Navarre* (c. 1370), ed. by L. Douët-d'Arcq (Choix pièces inédites?) Bouciquaut was born in 1368.
11. Meiss, Millard, *The Bouciquaut Master*, plate ____, London & New York, 1968. When Marcel Thomas dedicated his 1976 work *The Golden Age: Manuscript Painting at the time of Jean, Duke of Berry* to the late Millard Meiss, the Master's identity was still not accepted as Jaques Coene. The Bouciquaut Hours are said to be unusual for the use of green and white, possibly a reference to the *Escu Vert*. Why the new arms would be shown impaled with the old over the figure of Bouciquaut's wife may be explained by the idea of overpainting to accommodate a later owner, Diane de Poitiers. The bezants may have come from Bouciquaut's mother's family, the Linières, a prominent baronial family of Berry. The arms of Mauburin de Linières (on the same page as Bouciquaut's in the Navarre armorial) includes a bezanty field. He is not mentioned by Lalande. I am grateful to Jeanne-Marie Quevedo for pointing out the Navarre Armorial information. (This note has gathered a lot of moss.)

The reference to the published manuscript page and painting (black-and-white) may be superseded by a reference to the facsimile edition I have not seen yet. My comments on colors are based on the slide in my possession from Musée Jacquemart-André, with no permission to publish.

12. Greimas, Algirdas Julien, *Dictionnaire de l'acien francais: Le Moyen Age*, Paris, 1979
    Lalande, p. 94.
13. Barber, Richard and Barker, Juliet, Tournaments
14. Froissart, Jean, *Chronique*
15. Joanot Martorell and Martí Joan de Galba, *Tirant lo Blanc*, first published in 1490, transl. from Catalan by David H. Rosenthal, New York, 1984. The author says he started writing it in 1460.
16. *Livre des Faites, pp.* _____
17. Boulton, Jonathan D'Acre, *Knights of the Crown*, 1984

18. Lalande, p.94, Note 126.
19. Huizinga, Johan, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, English transl. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch, 1996, pp. 326-7.
20. *Livre des Faites, pp.*_____16. Lalande, *Livre des Faites*, Index of Proper Nouns, p. 470
21. Famiglietti, *p. 229-30, note 45.*
22. Courteault, Henri, *Gaston IV, Comte de Foix: Vicomte Souverain de Bearn, Prince de Navarre, 1423-1472, Etude Historique*... Toulouse, 1895.
23. Leguai, Andre, *Les Ducs de Bourbon pendant le crise monarchique du XVe Siècle – contribution à l'étude des apanages*, Dijon, 1962.
24. Famiglietti, *p. 167*